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COMMENT

ABUSING THE POWER TO REGULATE: THE CHILD

SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT OF 1992
Until recently, defendants challenging the constitutionality of
federal criminal statutes under the Commerce Clause have experienced little success. In United States v. Lopez,' Alfonzo Lopez
became the first defendant since 1937 to successfully attack a
statute on Commerce Clause grounds, as the Supreme Court held
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 19902 was beyond the
scope of congressional Commerce Clause power.' Since the
Court's holding in Lopez, criminal defendants have begun challenging many other federal criminal statutes enacted under Congress's
commerce power.4 Interestingly, even given the federal judiciary's
longstanding fight to reduce their criminal docket,5 most of these
new challenges have been unsuccessful.6
One statute currently under attack is the Child Support Recov-

1. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1990). The Act prohibited the possession of a gun near a
local school. Id.
3. 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
681 (1995) (carjacking); United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 543 (1995) (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); United States v.
Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568 (D. Kan. 1995) (Drug-Free School Zones Act).
5. See, e.g., Renee M. Landers, Federalization of State Law: Enhancing Opportunities
for Three-Branch and Federal-State Cooperation, 44 DEPAuL L. Rnv. 811, 812-13 (1995)
(discussing the federal judiciary's pressures to limit federal criminal jurisdiction).
6. See Deborah Jones Merritt, Reflections on United States v. Lopez: COMMERCE!,
94 MIcH. L. REv. 674, 712-27 (1995) (examining Commerce Clause decisions in the
three-month period after Lopez, showing that most challenges to laws have been unsuccessful); see, e.g., Bishop, 66 F.3d at 571 (upholding federal carijacking statute); United
States v. Parsons, 993 F.2d 38, 39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 266 (1993) (upholding federal arson statute).
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ery Act of 1992 (CSRA), which makes it a crime to willfully fail
to pay a child support obligation to a child living in another state,
if the obligation has been unpaid for more than one year or is over
$5,000. Popularly known as the "deadbeat dads" law, the CSRA
was enacted to deal with difficult interstate child support nonpayment cases, where states reportedly were not handling successfully
through traditional extradition processes.8 The CSRA is particularly
controversial because it potentially affronts federalism in two ways:
first, it overreaches Congress's commerce power under the Lopez
holding; and second, it invades the traditional state area of domestic relations law. A few district courts have recently invalidated the
CSRA,9 while several others have upheld the statute as a valid

7. 18 U.S.C. § 228(a), (d)(1)(B) (1995). The full text of the CSRA reads,
(a) Offense. Whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation with
respect to a child who resides in another State shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) Punishment. The punishment for an offense under this section is(1) in the case of a first offense under this section, a fine
under this title, imprisonment for not more than 6 months,
or both; and
(2) in any other case, a fine under this title, imprisonment
for not more than 2 years, or both.
(c) Restitution. Upon a conviction under this section, the court shall order restitution under section 3663 in an amount equal to the past due support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing.
(d) Definitions. As used in this section(1) the term "past due support obligation" means any
amount(A) determined under a court order or an order
of an administrative process pursuant to the law
of a State to be due from a person for the
support and maintenance of a child or of a
child and the parent with whom the child is
living; and
(B) that has remained unpaid for a period longer than one year, or is greater than $5,000;
and
(2) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, and
any other possession or territory of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 228 (1995).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 5-6 (1992) (concluding that
parents who willfully refuse to pay child support have markedly increased chances to
avoid payment obligations when they cross state lines).
9. E.g., United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 843 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United
States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 730 (W.D. Tex. 1995); United States v. Mussari, 894
F. Supp. 1360, 1361 (D. Ariz. 1995); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, 362
(D. Ariz. 1995). The Mussari and Schroeder opinions were both written by Judge
Rosenblatt, and the analyses are identical. This Comment will cite only to Mussari.
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exercise of the commerce power.'"
This Comment will examine the constitutionality of the CSRA
in light of the Court's holding in Lopez, concluding that the CSRA
is constitutional under current law. However, this Comment will
argue that although the CSRA is constitutional and does address a
serious national problem, it is an unwise exercise of federal criminal lawmaking power. The CSRA is essentially a measure intended
to allow federal resources to be used for a problem that can and
should be dealt with by the states. As such, it is a prime example
of what is wrong with the recent federalization of criminal law: it
is not a principled use of power, but is merely a means for using
federal resources to address a traditionally local criminal problem.
I.

COMMERCE CLAUSE

Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
commerce power as being virtually limitless. Before Lopez, scholars
repeatedly struggled to dream up a law that would not fall under
the Commerce Clause, as virtually any local activity can be linked
with interstate commerce." Although the Court has stressed that
there are outer limits to the commerce power, 2 it found none in
the cases before it from 1937 to 1995."3
Under Commerce Clause jurisprudence before Lopez, the
CSRA clearly would be a valid exercise of congressional power.
Two pre-Lopez cases particularly merit discussion, as they exemplify some of the outer bounds of the commerce power. In Wickard
v. Filburn,4 the Court upheld wheat quotas in the Agricultural
Adjustment Act as applied to a local farmer growing wheat partial-

10. E.g., United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 1996); United
States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84, 87 (D. Conn. 1995); United States v. Hopper, 899 F.
Supp. 389, 393 (S.D. Ind. 1995); United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. 614, 617 (w.D.
Va. 1995); United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327, 1331 (D. Kan. 1995).
11. See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 701 & n.39
(1996); Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 647
(1996).
12. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding that
the commerce power "may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them . . . would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local").
13. Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez,
46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 801, 803 (1996) [hereinafter Brickey, Crime Controll.
14. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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ly for home consumption. 5 This holding established the principle
that the Court may view individual activities in the "aggregate" in
order to6 determine whether they substantially affect interstate com1
merce.
In Perez v. United States,17 the Court upheld a federal criminal loan sharking law on the grounds that extortion affected interstate commerce. 8 The Court held that the law could be used to
prosecute loan sharks who were not involved in a larger interstate
economic enterprise or organized crime. 9 The Court reasoned that,
in the aggregate, loan sharking had a substantial adverse effect on
interstate commerce, reaching $350 million a year.2" Additionally,
it noted that an activity may be regulated under the commerce
power "'[e]ven if [it] be local and though it may not be regarded
as commerce, . . . if 2it exerts a substantial economic effect on
,
interstate commerce.' '
The CSRA would be an easy case under these precedents. The
legislative history shows that in 1989, $5.1 billion in child support
went unpaid, that interstate support cases account for one-third of
the cases for nonpayment, and that nonpayment of support has led
to an increase in child poverty and federal support for children
through welfare programs.22 Thus, this impact would constitute a
"substantial economic effect on interstate commerce" under
Wickard and Perez, as the aggregate impact of child support nonpayment on interstate commerce is greater than the activities regulated in those cases.' The fact that nonpayment of child support
may arguably not be considered "commerce" itself would not be
fatal under these cases.24 Moreover, the CSRA requires that every
case involve an interstate debt,2' while the statutes in Wickard and

15. Id. at 125.
16. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189 (2d ed. 1991).
17. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
18. Id. at 154.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 155.
21. Id. at 151-52 (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125).
22. H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1992).
23. Although one court invalidating the CSRA distinguished it from Wickard and
Perez, see United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 839-40 (E.D. Pa. 1995), this distinction was made on the basis of an application of those cases under the framework
articulated by the Court in Lopez, not the actual language of the decisions. See infra
notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Parker court's rationale).
24. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (1995) ("Whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support
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Perez regulated purely local activities.
As with every other statute considered by the Supreme Court
between 1936 and 1995, the CSRA would likely be held constitutional as a valid exercise of the commerce power before Lopez.
The constitutionality of the CSRA therefore depends in large part
on interpretation of the Court's decision in Lopez.
A.

The Lopez Framework

In Lopez, the Court identified "three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power." The
Court held that Congress may (1) "regulate the use of the channels
of interstate commerce";27 (2) "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities";' and (3) "regulate those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce."29 To rectify inconsistencies in the
language of prior case law, the Court confirmed that the proper test
for the third category is "whether the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce."30
The Gun-Free School Zones Act prohibited the possession of a
gun within 1000 feet of a school." The Court briefly concluded
that the Act could not fall in either of the first two categories,
because it did not regulate the channels of interstate commerce or
attempt to regulate things in commerce. 2 The government presented three arguments for upholding the Act under the third category.
Two examined the effects of the "costs of crime," and a third
focused on "national productivity. 33 First, it argued that posses-

obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State shall be punished as provided in subsection (b)" (emphasis added)).
26. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.
27. Id. As an example of this type of regulation, the Court cited United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941). Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. The Darby Court upheld
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which prohibited the shipment of certain goods in
interstate commerce when the wages and hours of the employees did not meet the requirements of the Act. 312 U.S. at 115.
28. Lopez, 115 S. Ct at 1629. For an example of this type of regulation, see 18
U.S.C. § 659 (1994), which prohibits thefts from interstate shipments.
29. Lopez, 115 S. Ct at 1629-30; see also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971) (upholding the federal loan sharking provision on the ground that loan sharking, in
the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce).
30. 115 S. Ct at 1630.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A).
32. 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
33. Id. at 1632.
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sion of a gun near a school may increase violent crime, and that
violent crime affects the national economy by increasing insurance
costs.34 Second, the government argued that an increase in violent
crime would decrease the amount of travel to the unsafe area,
again affecting the national economy.3" Finally, it argued that possessing guns in schools would inhibit the learning process, resulting
in a "less productive citizenry. 36
The Court held that these purported links with interstate commerce were not sufficient because recognition of the government's
arguments would essentially allow Congress to regulate anything
under the Commerce Clause. 37 The Court also held that the statute
had "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise. '' 3' Additionally, the Court invalidated the statute because
it did not contain a jurisdictional element limiting its application to
possession of firearms that effect interstate commerce.39 Although
the Court noted that it does not necessarily require legislative findings demonstrating the activity's effect on interstate commerce, it
stated that they would help in this case, where the connection was
not "visible to the naked eye."' The Lopez opinion did not explicitly overrule any previous Commerce Clause cases, although it
did call Wickard "the most far reaching example of Commerce
Clause authority over intrastate activity."'"
The problem in applying the Lopez decision to other cases is
that there actually is a connection between the Gun-Free School
Zones Act and commerce, albeit a tenuous one.42 Subsequent cases will have difficulty determining whether there is a sufficient
connection between the regulated act and interstate commerce. The
difficulty is determining where Lopez drew the line between sufficient and insufficient connections. Possibilities of where this line
might be drawn include (1) when the activity is not "economic" or

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. ("[Ilf we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed
to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.").
38. Id. at 1630-31.
39. Id. at 1631.
40. Id. at 1632. Although Congress had amended the Act in 1994 to include legislative
findings, the Government did not rely on these post-hoc findings in its argument, and the
Court did not examine them. Id. at 1632 n.4.
41. Id. at 1630.
42. See Nagel, supra note 11, at 651-52.
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"commercial";43 (2) when the statute lacks a jurisdictional requirement;" (3) when Congress does not provide legislative findings;45
or, (4) when recognition of an interstate connection would effec-

tively eliminate any limits on congressional commerce power.'
B.

The Constitutionality of the CSRA Under Lopez

Since the Lopez decision, several district courts have considered the constitutionality of the CSRA.47 Before exploring the application of the possible factors the Court found fatal to the GunFree School Zones Act, however, it is necessary to determine under
which basic Commerce Clause "category" the CSRA should be
examined.'
Most courts addressing the constitutionality of the CSRA
determined that the statute must be upheld, if at all, under Lopez's
"category three," as regulation of an activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce.49 One court upholding the statute,
however, likened the CSRA to a statute prohibiting fleeing across
state lines to avoid prosecution."0 Under this argument, the CSRA
may be upheld under Lopez's "category two," as a regulation of
the channels of interstate commerce.5 However, as other courts
have noted, the CSRA can apply to defendants whose children

43. See Brickey, Crime Control, supra note 13, at 806-11 (examining the semantics
and ramifications of this distinction).
44. See id. at 812-17 (exploring the ways in which Congress could potentially cure the
jurisdictional flaw in the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
45. See generally Frickey, supra note 11.
46. Professor Philip Frickey notes that this "slippery slope" reasoning concerned the
Court because it would "destroy any meaningful distinction between the local police power and the enumerated authority of Congress." Frickey, supra note 11, at 706.
47. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (setting forth the basic categories for
permissible regulation under the Commerce Clause).
49. See, e.g., Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 92 (upholding the CSRA under category three);
Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 393 ("This Court must therefore conclude that the CSRA is a
proper congressional regulation of an activity that substantially relates to interstate commerce."); Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1363 (observing that "if the CSRA is to be upheld, it
would have to be as a regulation of activities having a 'substantial relation to interstate
commerce"').
50. Murphy, 893 F. Supp. at 616 (The CSRA, along with other similar statutes, "seem
to be aimed at preventing an individual from escaping either law enforcement officers or
his own legal obligations by taking advantage of our federal system of government
through flight to another state.").
51. See id. at 617 (stating that Lopez does not bar regulation of the use of interstate
travel to avoid child support); see also Kegel, 916 F. Supp. at 1237 (upholding the CSRA
as a valid regulation of the channels of interstate commerce).
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move to another state, not merely those who purposely use interstate travel to avoid paying child support." Thus, the argument
for including the CSRA in "category two" is fairly weak. This
Comment will focus on the constitutionality of the CSRA as a
regulation of an activity that "substantially affects" commerce.
1. Economic or Commercial Activity
One court that determined the CSRA to be unconstitutional asserted that the Lopez decision changed the "substantial effects" test
so that Congress may no longer aggregate activities quantitatively
(in dollar figures) to show a substantial effect on commerce, but
instead must look at the qualitative aspects of the activity to determine whether it is "economic" or "commercial."5 3 In Parker, the
court held that congressional findings of annual aggregate deficit of
$5.1 billion in unpaid child support was not enough to show a
substantial effect on commerce. 4 The court explained that while
previous Commerce Clause cases have held that less significant
monetary effects on the national economy were sufficient, "in
Lopez, the Court demonstrated that the focus must be on the activity, not the dollar figure."55 Applying this test, the Parker court
asserted that the activity regulated by the CSRA was in no way
qualitatively related to commerce: "The failure to make these [child
support] payments affects primarily the parents and the children
born of or dependent upon the marriage. Arm's-length commercial
actors are not involved in any way. The marketplace for goods and
services and prices of commodities are not affected at all." 6
Even if the Lopez Court did negate the use of quantitative
data, the CSRA would still pass constitutional muster qualitatively.

52. See Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1364 (noting that there is no "intent to flee requirement" in the CSRA).
53. United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 835. The court also qualitatively distinguished the failure to pay child support from the activities regulated in Wickard and Perez, arguing that the regulation of
wheat affects the price of goods, and that loan sharking involves organized crime, a national enterprise. Id. at 839-40.
In Mussari, the court reasoned that the CSRA was not related to commerce primarily
because states have traditionally been responsible for enforcing child support payments.
Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1363. However, this reasoning is inappropriate, as the states'
traditional responsibility for enforcing child support payments indicates only that child
support obligations are traditionally local, intrastate concerns, not that they are not "commercial" or "economic."
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The Parker court characterized the activity regulated by the CSRA
inaccurately. Essentially, the CSRA is criminally enforcing an
interstate debt. The Hopper court observed that "the act of collecting an obligation, though dealing with an intangible, does amount
to commerce," as it involves the exchange of money and communications: 7 Similarly, in Sage, the court reasoned that while child
support payments may not be characterized as "commerce," they
are "economic" in the sense that "[tihe non-custodial parent reaps
an economic gain each time a support payment is withheld, while
the offspring suffers an economic loss."' Clearly, then, child support payments are "economic," and are certainly distinguishable
from possession of a firearm.
At this point, however, the Lopez Court's distinction between
commercial, economic, and non-commercial activities merits further
scrutiny. While it is clear the CSRA addresses an activity that is
"economic," it is arguable this debt would not be a "commercial
transaction" in the traditional sense. However, the Lopez Court was
not clear in defining precisely what it meant, as it treated
"commercial" and "economic" as interchangeable words. 9 At one
point, the Court stated that the Gun-Free School Zones Act does
not deal with "commerce," "economic enterprise," and "is not an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity. ' " Then,
it referred to the Commerce Clause cases upholding regulations of
"activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction."'" At the same time, the Court also distinguished the
Wickard holding on the grounds that the activity there "involved
economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school
zone does not."'62 Justice Kennedy's concurrence asserted that
Congress may regulate "transactions of a commercial nature."63
The problem is that all these words used interchangeably by

57. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 392.
58. Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 89-90. The court also cited United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d
569, 577 (3d Cir.); cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 681 (1995), for support in distinguishing the
crime prohibited in Lopez (possession of a firearm near a school) from other crimes. Id.
In Bishop, the court upheld the constitutionality of the federal carjacking statute, reasoning
that such activity is economic, involving gains and losses. Bishop, 66 F.3d at 580.
59. Brickey, Crime Control, supra note 13, at 806-07.
60. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 1630 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Kennedy's opinion also
concluded that "Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that
we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy." Id.
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the Court have different meanings.' Professor Brickey argues that,
based on other Supreme Court precedent, the Lopez Court did not
intend to limit these terms to include only activities with a profit
seeking motive. 5 Instead, she argues, a rational reading of Lopez
allows congressional regulation when the regulated activity is "economic," "commercial," or "noncommercial" with a substantial effect
on an economic enterprise.'
This argument is supported by the fact that other laws upheld
by the Court in previous Commerce Clause cases were not limited
to regulations of profit seeking activities. For example, if the
Court's definition of "commercial" or "economic" is so narrow that
it does not encompass an interstate debt, it would probably also
dictate invalidation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and overruling
Katzenbach v. McClung.' Certainly, the Lopez Court did not intend to invalidate volumes of federal civil rights and criminal law
on the grounds that the activities were not "commercial"; the Court
in Lopez did not explicitly overrule any prior cases, and the ruling
seems to indicate it is merely setting an outer limit on the commerce power.6"
64. Black's Law Dictionary defines "commerce" as follows:
The exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind; the
buying, selling, and exchanging of articles. The transportation of persons and
property by land, water and air.
Intercourse by way of trade or traffic between different peoples or
states and the citizens or inhabitants thereof, including not only the purchase,
sale, and exchange of commodities, but also the instrumentalities and agencies
by which it is promoted and the means and appliances by which it is carried
on, and transportation of persons as well as of goods, both by land and sea.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 269 (6th ed. 1991) (citations omitted). "Economic" has been
defined as "pertaining to the production, distribution, and use of income, wealth, and
commodities" or "involving or pertaining to one's personal resources of money." THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 618 (2d ed. 1987).
65. Brickey, Crime Control, supra note 13, at 808-11 (comparing Justice Rehnquist's
Lopez opinion with his opinion in National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,
114 S. Ct. 798 (1994)).
66. Id.
67. 379 U.S. 294 (1964). There, the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act as applied to a
local restaurant, because the restaurant received food that had traveled in interstate commerce. Id. at 300-01; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 243 (1964) (upholding the Civil Rights Act as applied to a motel operator). The
primary activity regulated by the Civil Rights Act is discrimination. See Heart of Atlanta
Motel, 379 U.S. at 245-46, 250 (describing the purposes of the executive and legislative
branches in enacting the Civil Rights Act). Discrimination is qualitatively much more
social than "economic," but quantitatively does have a substantial impact on interstate
commerce. Nagel, supra note 11, at 647.
68. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor, stated that the
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Courts upholding the CSRA have recognized this distinction,
and have narrowly read the limits on Congress's Commerce Clause
power set forth in Lopez. For example, in Sage, the court recognized that "[a] regulated activity ... need not be commercial in
order to be economic."'69 In Hopper, the court reasoned that "com-

merce" does not have to involve a commodity or be a commercial
transaction in the traditional sense.' Regulation of the failure to
pay child support is clearly an "economic" regulation that merely
happens to involve members of the same family instead of arm's
length business actors. Under a careful interpretation of Lopez, this
activity should qualitatively fall under the commerce power.
2.

Jurisdictional Element and Legislative Findings

The CSRA contains both a jurisdictional element and congressional findings. The absence of these elements proved fatal to the
Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez.7 ' The CSRA explicitly requires that each case involve a child support obligation where the
parent and child reside in different states.' Additionally, Congress
made specific legislative findings that failure to pay child support
affects interstate commerce, and that state enforcement of interstate
cases was not effective. 3 While the courts holding the CSRA unconstitutional asserted that these factors were not dispositive,74 and
that the Lopez decision is unclear on the issue of whether an explicit jurisdictional element and contemporary legislative findings
could have saved the Gun-Free School Zones Act,7 it is clear that
statutes upheld in Perez, Katzenbach, and Heart of Atlanta Motel "are within the fair
ambit of the Court's practical conception of commercial regulation and are not called in
question by our decision today." 115 S. Ct at 1637 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
Brickey, Crime Control, supra note 13, at 811 ("[T]he [Lopez] Court succeeded in invalidating the Act as an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce power without overruling
a single case.').
69. Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 89.
70. 899 F. Supp. at 392-93.
71. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (summarizing the Lopez Court's
statements that had the Gun-Free School Zones Act contained these two elements, it
would more likely have been found constitutional).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (1993); see also Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 91; Murphy, 893 F.
Supp. at 616 ("Unlike § 922(q), § 228 does have a jurisdictional element that ensures it
will not intrude upon matters with no relation to interstate commerce."); Hampshire, 892
F. Supp. at 1330.
73. H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 4-6 (1992); see also Sage, 906 F.
Supp. at 90-91.
74. See Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1363-64; United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830,
836 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The Bailey court did not even address these issues.
75. See Frickey, supra note 11, at 707 ("Lopez provides no authoritative answer to the
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legislative findings can significantly aid in showing the link to
interstate commerce.76 Here, therefore, they help to tip the scale in
favor of the CSRA's constitutionality.
3.

"Slippery Slope" Arguments

While the government's arguments in the Lopez case proposed
a limitless commerce power over local activities, there are arguments that can be used to uphold the CSRA while still keeping a
limit on the Commerce Clause power. In Parker, the government
argued that the failure to pay child support makes children and
custodial parents unable to buy many commodities, goods, and
services, thereby affecting interstate commerce. 7 Similarly, it argued that nonpayment of support results in poverty, which in turn
requires federal funds to support the children through welfare programs." The Parker court analogized these arguments to the
government's "cost of crime"" and "national productivity"8 arguments in Lopez, which were rejected as limitless by the Supreme
Court.8'
While these arguments may sound overreaching, when one
superimposes the actual statute on them, they still allow for limits
on the commerce power. Under the arguments supporting the
CSRA, it is probable that the federal government could regulate all
interstate debt. 2 However, by its terms, the CSRA is not attempting to regulate any intrastate debt, or non-economic activities in the
area of domestic relations. Certainly, the Lopez Court's rejection of
the government's arguments does not mean that every argument
that involves implications on the national economy will be rejected;
however, it does mean that the Court will not accept limitless arguments when the regulated activity "tenuously . . . relate[s] to interstate commerce."83 Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the

future utility of congressional findings ....
").
76. See id. (arguing that "the Supreme Court considered the lack of findings [in Lopez]
simply to negate one source of potential support for the proposition that the statute had a
rational connection to interstate commerce").
77. Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 837.
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 33, 36 and accompanying text.
81. 911 F. Supp. at 837-39.
82. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (asserting that the collection of debts is
"commerce"). This is not problematic, as the commerce power extends to all "interstate
commerce."
83. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632; see also Brickey, Crime Control, supra note 13, at
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CSRA does not involve a tenuous link to the national economy;
the activity itself is economic, and linking a lack of financial support to commerce does not involve the same mental gymnastics as
the government's Lopez arguments. Thus, the government can
argue to uphold the CSRA without asserting a limitless commerce
power.
As this analysis has shown, the various factors that were fatal
to the Gun-Free School Zones Act in Lopez are not discrete, dispositive requirements, but are interrelated. 4 In the case of the
CSRA, all factors point to its constitutionality, as it regulates an
economic activity, explicitly requires a link to interstate commerce,
demonstrates a substantial effect on interstate commerce through
legislative findings, and does not require the prospect of limitless
commerce power to justify its constitutionality.
II.

PROVINCE OF THE STATES

Courts invalidating the CSRA also have done so on the
grounds that the entire subject matter of domestic relations is the
province of the states, and may not be regulated by the federal
government. These holdings contain three major lines of reasoning:
(1) the domestic relations exception to federal diversity jurisdiction
supports invalidation of the CSRA; (2) Lopez specifically stated
that domestic relations is an area left to the states; and (3) principles found in other cases, such as Younger's "federalism" and
"comity" concerns, could be used to invalidate the CSRA. However, courts that have invalidated the CSRA on these grounds have
misapplied the Lopez holding, the domestic relations exception, and
abstention doctrines to come to these conclusions. There is nothing
that prevents Congress from regulating traditional subject matter of
the states through the commerce power.
A.

The Domestic Relations Exception

Federal courts have a long-standing domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction. The exception stems from dicta in
85 and has been recognized in its progeny.86
Barber v. Barber,
827.
84. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 685 (1996).
85. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858) ("We disclaim altogether any jurisdiction in
the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the allowance of alimony.,).
86. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards. 504 U.S. 689. 693-701 (1992); De La Rama v.
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This exception does not allow district courts to refuse jurisdiction
over all diversity cases that touch on domestic relations, only those
that involve a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.87 The
court in Bailey invoked this exception in support of its determination that the CSRA is unconstitutional.88 However, this reliance is
misplaced. The domestic relations exception is an exception to
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, not federal question
jurisdiction.89 Thus, where Congress regulates a matter of domestic
relations through the Commerce Clause, the exception does not
90
apply
B.

The Lopez Dicta on Domestic Relations

The Bailey court also relied on dicta in the Lopez case indicating that the subject matter of domestic relations is reserved for
the states, so Congress may not regulate it under the commerce
power.9' The Lopez majority was concerned that "under the
Government's 'national productivity' reasoning, Congress could
regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic
productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage,
divorce, and child custody), for example."' As the Bailey court
noted, even Justice Breyer's dissent observed that family law would
serve as a limit on the commerce power.93 Specifically, Justice
Breyer stated that to uphold the statute in Lopez would not be "to
hold that the Commerce Clause permits the Federal Government
to ... regulate 'marriage, divorce, and child custody."' 94 Based

De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906).
87. See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703-04 (affirming the domestic relations exception
with regard to divorce and alimony decrees and child custody orders, but holding that it
does not apply to a tort action between child and parent for abuse).
88. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 729.
89. See Ankenbrandr, 504 U.S. at 695-97 (stating that the domestic relations exception
is based on an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the federal diversity jurisdiction statute,
not the Constitution); see also Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330 (noting that the exception is a rule "in which the Court has adopted a narrow interpretation of the federal
courts' civil diversity jurisdiction to exclude domestic relations cases").
90. See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 695-97; Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 92; Hampshire, 892
F. Supp. at 1330-31 ("[B]ecause the domestic relations exception is rooted in a narrow
construction of the diversity jurisdiction statute, . . . the rule has no application where
there exists an independent basis for federal jurisdiction beyond diversity of citizenship. . . . Accordingly, the domestic relations exception has no application.").
91. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 727.
92. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
93. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 727.
94. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1661 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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on this dicta, the Bailey court held that the CSRA "sounds, walks,
and looks like a domestic relations statute and aims the central
'
government down a slippery slope where it should not be."95
While reliance on the Lopez dicta may be warranted if Congress were to assert federal jurisdiction over marriage, divorce, or
child custody, the CSRA does not go this far. Instead, it merely
enforces a past due state order to pay child custody through criminal sanctions.96 Thus, the CSRA does not permit federal courts to
make child custody decrees or determine a fair amount of child
support; it allows them to punish nonpayers. As such, it does not
invade any "core" family law prerogative of the state because it
does not allow federal courts to create or modify orders. Many
courts have distinguished between "'core' cases, such as a petition
for divorce or a request for child custody," and "'peripheral' domestic relations cases, such as an interspousal tort suit for interference with custody rights."' In fact, many other federal laws touch
on domestic relations law without regulating marriage, divorce, and
child custody orders.9" Thus, as the Hampshire court noted, "The

95. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 730.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 228(c) (1993 & Supp. 1995); see also Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at
1330-31 ("The present case does not involve a diversity action directed at obtaining a
divorce or child custody decree or for an award of alimony. It is a criminal action undertaken pursuant to an express grant of jurisdictional authority.").
97. Barbara A. Atwood, Domestic Relations Cases in Federal Court: Toward a Principled Exercise of Jurisdiction, 35 HASTINGs L.J. 571, 603 & n.206 (1984) (exploring judicial distinctions between "core" family law cases, involving matters such as a "request for
child custody" and "peripheral" cases, which do not require inquiry into the parties' relationships, in the context of diversity jurisdiction); see also Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 70304 (1992) (distinguishing divorce, alimony, and child custody orders from other suits, such
as a tort claim for abuse).
Apart from the Lopez dicta, it is actually questionable under Supreme Court precedent whether Congress could regulate all family law, as well as other traditional subject
matters of the state, as long as it could show the requisite "substantial effects" on interstate commerce. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding that a congressional act pursuant to the Commerce Clause is valid even though it intrudes on a traditional
state function); see also Frickey, supra note 11, at 720. Dean Jesse Choper argues that
the division of power between the states and the federal government should be kept within the political process. Jesse Choper, Did Last Term Reveal "A Revolutionary States'
Rights Movement within the Supreme Court"?, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 663, 670
(1996).
98. See Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the
Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1721-29 (1991) (discussing how federal laws on
welfare programs, taxation, bankruptcy, constitutional law, and pensions regulate family
relationships).
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[Lopez] Court's opinion cannot be read to suggest that all federal
legislation touching upon domestic relations is necessarily invalid."799
C. Federalism and Comity
The Mussari court held that "[p]rinciples of federalism and
comity also support this court's finding that the CSRA is unconstitutional."" The court was concerned that application of the statute may require federal courts to review state court orders, in violation of federalism and comity "principles" if a defendant challenged the validity of an underlying state court order.1"' Similarly,
°2 for the proposition
the Bailey court cited Younger v. Harris"
that "comity" requires federal courts to respect state court judgments. °3 Thus, it concluded that the CSRA may require federal
courts to review state court orders, in violation of the Constitution." 4
Reliance on the Younger doctrine in this situation is misplaced. This doctrine requires federal court abstention when allowing jurisdiction would interfere with an ongoing state criminal
proceeding.0 5 Younger has been extended to include ongoing
state civil proceedings,"° and some exceptional state civil proceedings that are not ongoing. 7 In fact, a prosecution brought in
federal court under the CSRA may call for Younger abstention if
there is a concurrent state proceeding concerning the defendant's
child support payments. However, the Younger doctrine has not
been used to find statutes unconstitutional; to do so would require
an unprecedented extension of the doctrine.' Thus, while the

99. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330 (emphasis in original).
100. 894 F. Supp. at 1367.
101. Id.
102. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
103. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 728.
104. Id. at 728-29.
105. Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
106. See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 432 (1982) (extending the Younger doctrine to an ongoing "noncriminal judicial
proceeding").
107. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 17 (1987) (holding that because
Texaco did not give Texas courts an opportunity to hear the case, there is no basis for
concluding Texas law and procedures are so deficient that the Younger abstention is inappropriate).
108. See Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 393 ("[T]his Court can find no case where those
'principles' were held to be grounds to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. . ..
The abstention doctrine is designed to promote federal-state comity, under which the court
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doctrine may apply to certain individual cases under the CSRA,'
it cannot be used to find the CSRA unconstitutional.

9

IX. APPLICATION OF THE CSRA
The arguments made by courts invalidating the CSRA did not
come out of thin air; although they are not sufficient to invalidate
the actual law, concerns about the federalization of criminal and
family law are serious and will manifest themselves in application
of the CSRA. The problem with the CSRA is not its constitutionality, or the lack of a national problem. Instead, the problem is that
the statute is a naked enforcement scheme, designed not as a substantive provision, but as a jurisdictional hook to bring "deadbeat
dads" into federal court.
There are some serious hurdles to effective application of the
CSRA that bring its value into question. In applying the CSRA, a
federal judge need only determine whether there is a state order
that has been unpaid for over a year or that is over $5,000, whether the child lives in a different state than the defendant, and
whether the defendant "willfully" failed to pay support (i.e., had
sufficient income to pay but did not)." ' As the Mussari and
Bailey courts noted, there are many other issues that a defendant
could potentially raise, including a challenge to the validity of the
state court order, or present ability to find employment."' Although these concerns are not sufficient to invalidate the CSRA,
they may lead to application of the abstention doctrines in many
cases. In fact, at least one of the defendants challenging the CSRA
argued for abstention as an alternative ground for dismissing his
case."

2

The abstention doctrines are used by federal courts to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction over a certain case or claim due to
federalism and comity concerns, when such jurisdiction would
interfere with a particular state function or interest." 3 Procedural-

may refuse to exercise jurisdiction in a matter which would disrupt the establishment of a
coherent state policy.").
109. Cf Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 393 ("In the present case, the Younger abstention is
inapplicable because there are no pending state criminal proceedings which this Court may
defer to."); Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1331 ("In the present case, the Younger abstention is inapplicable because there are no pending state proceedings.").
110. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
111. Bailey. 902 F. Supp. at 729; Mussari, 894 F. Supp. at 1367.
112. See Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1331 (asserting Younger and Burford abstention).
113. ERWIN CHEIERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICriON § 12.1 (2d ed. 1994).
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ly, when a federal court abstains, it may retain jurisdiction over the
federal issue and stay the proceedings pending resolution of the
state issue in state court; or, depending on the type of abstention,
it may dismiss the case altogether." 4 Understandably, abstention
can lead to lengthy and inefficient litigation, as the parties must go
back and forth between state and federal court in order to have all
their claims heard.
Two abstention doctrines, Burford and Younger abstention,
may be particularly relevant in cases under the CSRA. In
Ankenbrandt, the Supreme Court observed that Burford abstention
"might be relevant in a case involving elements of the domestic
relationship even when the parties do not seek divorce, alimony, or
'
child custody."115
Burford abstention is proper when a case presents an issue of unique importance to a state, and jurisdiction
would disrupt state policymaking or a state administrative process
on the issue." 6 For example, in Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,"7 the
Supreme Court held that a federal court should refuse jurisdiction
over a suit for an injunction concerning the grant of an oil drilling
permit by a Texas commission despite the fact that the claim posed
a colorable federal question, because Texas had unique concerns
for consistency and expertise in administrating the grant of drilling
permits." 8 Likewise, Burford abstention could apply in the domestic relations context because many states have developed judicial expertise in "core" family law cases, which in most states may
only be heard in certain specialized courts. "' Thus, if a defendant
prosecuted in federal court under the CSRA legitimately challenged
the underlying state custody or support orders, the federal court
could simply dismiss the case. 2

114. Id. § 12.3.
115. 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992).
116. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-15
(1976); see also Atwood, supra note 97, at 605-06 (explaining Burford abstention).
117. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
118. Id. at 332-34.
119. Atwood, supra note 97, at 606-07 & n.229. Professor Atwood poses an argument
that Burford abstention may not apply to core domestic relations cases because, arguably,
"[s]tate laws governing divorce and child custody, while comprehensive, ordinarily will not
amount to a complex regulatory scheme of the type that triggered abstention in Burford
itself." Id. at 607. Still, Professor Atwood acknowledges that the Court would most likely
approve of Burford abstention in the domestic relations context, as "[a] complex regulatory scheme . . . is not an essential element of Burford abstention." Id. at 608-09.
120. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 113, § 12.3 ("The effect of Burford abstention is
thus not to postpone federal court review but to prevent it entirely.").
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Apart from Burford abstention, there could be abstention in
cases brought under the CSRA under Younger v. Harris.' As
noted earlier, Younger abstention could apply to a CSRA prosecution if there is an ongoing state proceeding regarding the status of
the support order."
Arguably, there is no reason to believe that abstention will be
applied under the CSRA any more or less than in any other area
of federal jurisdiction. It will not apply to cases where the status
of the parties is settled as a matter of state law."z However, given the federal courts' animosity toward domestic relations issues124 and concerns about the federalization of criminal law,"z
it is foreseeable that judges will use these abstention doctrines
liberally in applying the CSRA.
The fact that many cases under the CSRA may never reach
the merits because of underlying state claims expose the statute for
what it really is: a naked enforcement provision for an interstate
debt, devoid of any substance. Ironically, it is just this lack of
substance that keeps the CSRA from being an invalid exercise of
the commerce power. As noted earlier, if the statute did give federal courts the substantive power to grant and modify child support
orders, it may be unconstitutional under Lopez." The question

121. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
122. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text (asserting that while Younger's abstention doctrine may not be used to entirely invalidate the CSRA, such abstention may
be called for in individual cases).
123. See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 706 ('Where, as here, the status of the domestic
relationship has been determined as a matter of state law, and in any event has no bearing on the underlying torts alleged, we have no difficulty concluding that Burford abstention is inappropriate in this case."); Hopper, 899 F. Supp. at 394 ("There are no issues of
Indiana law which are of great importance from a public policy perspective immediately
apparent in this case. Therefore, this Court concludes that it need not abstain from deciding the case at bar.").
124. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (summarizing Professor Judith
Resnik's view that domestic relations is an example of the etclusion of women from
federal courts).
125. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The Federalizationof American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1135, 1168 (1995) [hereinafter Brickey, Criminal Mischie]
(highlighting Justice Rehnquist's warning about the duplication of state criminal law in
federal courts); Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the Federalization Debate, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 967, 968 (1995) (describing the plan of the Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which
recommends decreasing federal criminal jurisdiction).
126. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
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remains, then, why Congress would want to federalize this offense,
and whether it makes sense to federalize the nonpayment of child
support.
IV.

SOCIETAL MOBILITY AND THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL

LAW

An increase in geographic mobility has led to extensions of
the commerce power by Congress and the courts.' As society
has increasingly become more mobile, state borders tend to disappear, and more and more activities become linked economically. "28
' As a result, many problems that were once local have now
become national.'29 Thus, it is not surprising that Congress has
responded by federalizing traditionally "local" crimes, such as the
failure to pay child support. 3 ' Many crimes, by their unique interstate or international nature, demand federal responses.' The
CSRA does address a national problem, arguably a wise reason for
Congress to assert its commerce power and regulate.
Additionally, the CSRA marks a turning point in federal jurisdiction by providing greater access to federal courts for women. In
1991, Professor Judith Resnik documented how women have been
perpetually excluded from the federal courts, both in terms of
participation as judges and staff, as well as in the subject matter of
federal jurisdiction.'32 Specifically, Professor Resnik argued that
domestic relations law, an area traditionally associated with women,

127. See Brickey, Criminal Mischief, supra note 125, at 1141-45 (tracing the increase in
cultural mobility and the corresponding rise in the federalization of crime).
128. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628 (stating that the modem expansion of Congress's
Commerce Clause authority "was a recognition of the great changes that had occurred in
the way business was carried on in this country"); see also Brickey, Crime Control, supra
note 13 ("[A]s commerce inexorably forged a national economy, the line began to
blur.... [P]roblems that had formerly been localized in one state could quickly migrate
to others.").
129. See Sara Sun Beale, Reporter's Draft for the Working Group on Principles to Use
When Considering the Federalization of Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1277, 1293
(1995) ("[The public has come to rely increasingly on the federal government to provide
solutions to any important national problem, including crime.").
130. Currently, there are over 3,000 federal crimes on the books. Beale, supra note 129,
at 1282; Brickey, Criminal Mischief supra note 125, at 1135 n.l.
131. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Honorable John Gleeson, The Federalization of
Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1098
(1995) (arguing that investigating and prosecuting organized crime particularly needs federalization); see also Beale, supra note 129, at 1296 (suggesting criteria for federal criminal
jurisdiction).
132. See generally Resnik, supra note 98.
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has been repeatedly disdained and marginalized by the federal
courts.' Although it may not have been Congress's explicit intent, enactment of the CSRA acknowledges what is primarily a
women's problem, 34 bringing it to national attention and into the
federal system.' However, it is questionable whether this is a
convincing justification for federalization.
Federalization also occurs "in order to emphasize the importance of the issue involved."'36 Thus, the current political culture
dictates that if Congress does not address an important problem
through legislation, the public perceives that it does not care about
the problem.'37 As a result, traditionally local issues are often
federalized purely for political gain."3 Most recently, politicians
have sought political capital by being "tough on crime"; 39 likewise, the CSRA's attack on "deadbeat dads" certainly achieves this
goal.
Additionally, federal criminal law is often desirable because
the federal system has more resources at its disposal, and generally
imposes greater sentences than state law. Many state justice systems are strapped for resources and overwhelmed by caseloads,
whereas federal resources for investigators and prosecutors are
more plentiful." Thus, "the federalization of crimes traditionally

133. ad at 1756-57.
134. The House Report on the CSRA notes that "ten million women head households
with children whose father is absent from the home," and that "[tihe poverty rate of
families with children from an absent father has risen steadily throughout the 1980s."
H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 4-5 (1992).
135. The Violence Against Women Act also federalizes and highlights a women's issue,
making it a federal crime to cross a state line with the intent to harm a spouse or domestic partner. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1995).
136. William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719,
723 (1995)
137. See id. at 724; Beale, supra note 129, at 1293.
138. Marshall, supra note 136, at 724.
139. Professor Sanford Kadish traces the typical federalization of a state criminal law as
follows:
Some dramatic crimes or series of crimes are given conspicuous media coverage, producing what is perceived, and often is, widespread public anxiety. Seeking to make political hay, some legislator proposes a new law to make this or
that a major felony or to raise the penalty or otherwise tighten the screws.
Since other legislators know well that no one can lose voter popularity for
seeming to be tough on crime, the legislation sails through in a breeze.
Sanford H. Kadish, Comment: The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1247,
1248 (1995).
140. See Beale, supra note 129, at 1293; see also Honorable J. Anthony Kline, Comment: The Politicalization of Crime, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1087, 1088 (1995) (noting that
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prosecuted by the states and resulting [federal law enforcement]
budget increases could be seen as a form of in-kind fiscal relief for
state and local government."'4 1 In the case of the CSRA, it is
evident that one of the underlying reasons Congress decided to
federalize the crime of failure to pay child support was to enable
the use of federal resources in child support nonpayment cases. As
the legislative history shows, the CSRA is a duplication of existing
state law, 42 so its only substantive effect is to transfer cases to
federal court, thereby transferring resources.
V.

TOWARD A REASONABLE USE OF FEDERAL POWER

Do we really need federal resources here? We do not need
them in the same way that we need federal money and sophistication for investigating and prosecuting organized crime, or interstate
and international drug gangs.'43 One can hardly imagine an interstate "gang" of "deadbeat dads" conspiring to deprive their children
of support payments; cases falling under the CSRA are individual,
discrete matters. While resources are obviously necessary for investigation and prosecution of these cases, there is no convincing
reason why they have to come from a jurisdictional hook that
arbitrarily transfers cases to federal court," or that they have to
come from the federal government at all. 4 '

while the federal judicial budget averages out to about $4 million per federal judge, the
California budget is less than $1 million per judge).
141. Beale, supra note 129, at 1291 (explaining the opinion of one participant in a
roundtable on federal jurisdiction).
142. The House Report on the CSRA acknowledges that states have provisions for
enforcing child support orders among the states; however, the Report concludes that these
provisions are not working. H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 5-6 (1992).
143. See generally Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 131 (discussing the need for federal
resources to attack organized crime).
144. Apart from the CSRA, Congress has made federal resources available to states for
collection and prosecution of child support nonpayment cases through many other channels. H.R. REP. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 12-15 (1992).
145. The participants in a roundtable on the federalization of criminal law observed,
"[T]he large federal tax burden places practical limitations on the resources that can be
raised by the states. If federal taxes were reduced, states could increase their own taxes
and correspondingly increase their expenditures for law enforcement." Beale, supra note
129, at 1291. Similarly, Professor Marshall asserts, "Logically, it would seem that the
protection of the resources and the abilities of the state courts to effectively function
should be the top judicial priority. . . . A political culture that treats the federal courts as
the premiere guardians of important rights and thereby relegates the state courts to essentially secondary status, can only exacerbate the state courts' resource concerns." Marshall,
supra note 136, at 735-36.
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One may argue that federal resources are necessary to attack
the difficult interstate cases." Still, states already have the legal
means to handle these cases. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act, adopted by most states, provides for reciprocal
enforcement of child support orders obtained in another state.47
Thus, "the fact that deplorable conduct is widespread in the United
States, and in that sense constitutes a national problem, hardly
warrants making that conduct a federal crime when it is already
adequately covered by state law."'1 8 Practically speaking, the
states should be able to handle interstate cases, as they are distinct,
individual cases, not organized crime syndicates.
Professor Jonathan Macey observed that federal regulators will
rationally choose not to regulate in an area where it will be more
efficient to stay out if, over time, local regulators have developed
expertise and essentially built up a capital asset in a particular
area." 9 As an example, he cites Delaware's corporate law, which
dominates the subject area despite the fact that Congress could
federalize it under the commerce powerY ° Similarly, states have
built up expertise in the area of domestic relations, and many have
specialized courts to handle domestic relations cases.' Congress
should recognize that family law, like Delaware's corporate law, is
an area where states have built up significant expertise 5 and
effi2
ciency over time, accumulating value as a "capital asset.'1
This assertion is certainly not meant to insinuate that domestic
relations law is "below" the federal courts, as the judiciary has
sometimes suggested;.5 . it is merely a recognition that states have
developed expertise in this area, which cannot be disregarded. This
contention is also not meant to forewarn that Congress is leading

146. See Gorelick & Litman, supra note 125, at 974-75 (arguing that the federal government is "uniquely positioned" to prosecute certain interstate cases that will otherwise
never be reached by the states).
147. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3115.01-.34 (Anderson 1994). Most states
have also criminalized the failure to pay child support. H.R. REP. No. 771, at 5-6.
148. Kadish, supra note 139, at 1249.
149. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L.
REV. 265, 268 (1990).

150. Id. at 277-78.
151. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
152. See Macey, supra note 149, at 279-80.
153. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (summarizing Professor Judith
Resnik's assertion that domestic relations law has been treated with disdain and
marginalized by federal courts).
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down a "slippery slope"' 54 that will eventually federalize all family law. In fact, the Department of Justice has emphasized that it
will only prosecute the most serious offenders under the CSRA
who have previously outsmarted state enforcement agencies.' 55
This assertion does mean, however, that enactment of the
CSRA is not the most efficient or effective way to deal with the
problem of "deadbeat dads." Like most of the recent federal crimi56
nal statutes, it is another example of federalization run rampant.
Moreover, it is a wasteful duplication of state law, enacted to
emphasize and address a particular politically "hot" issue with
federal resources. As such, it is not a wise or principled use of
federal commerce power.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The CSRA is one of many recent examples of federal criminal
law running out of control. It may be constitutional, but it is not a
wise use of federal resources or commerce power. With increased
societal mobility, state courts must be able to deal with a variety
of issues which involve crossing borders. The answer to this is not
to federalize everything that walks across a state line. While some
problems are essentially national and call for the use of the federal
government, child support recovery is not one of them. Federal
government is not uniquely able to solve the problem of "deadbeat

154. See Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 730 (warning that Congress is heading down a "slippery slope" by encroaching on family law).
155. Jamie Gorelick and Harry Litman assert that the prosecutorial criteria are aimed
selectively at the few offenders who have been successful in abusing state jurisdictional
boundaries, the precise offenders who justify federal presence. Gorelick & Litman, supra
note 125, at 974-75. Even with this limit, however, there is increasing pressure to prosecute all cases failing under the CSRA. Deadbeat Dad Enforcement: DOJ on Tightrope,
DOJ Alert, January 2-16, 1995, found in Westlaw, JLR.
History has shown, however, that prosecutorial discretion is not always the best
mechanism for limiting federal enforcement merely to cases that states cannot handle.
Federal courts currently handle numerous drug cases that involve small-time, local violators. Brickey, Criminal Mischief, supra note 125, at 1159-61. In fact, Alfonzo Lopez was
a student whose case had no particular facts that set it apart from other state gun possession violators. Brickey, Crime Control, supra note 13, at 804-05.
156. Scholars have repeatedly characterized the federalization of criminal drug law as
the best example of overfederalization and waste of resources. See, e.g., Kadish, supra
note 139, at 1251; Brickey, Criminal Mischief supra note 125, at 1150-65.
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dads." Given the proper legal and fimancial means, states can and
should be able to address this problem just as effectively as the
federal government.
REBECCA A. WISTNER

